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Abstract
A widely-held assumption in the study of litigation and settlement is
that if litigation is costly and settlement bargaining is costless, then in
a complete-information setting, all disputes will settle with no need for
litigation. This assumption is wrong. Even with complete information,
perfectly rational parties may fail to settle out of court, and plaintiffs
will spend resources to file suit, only for the parties thereafter to settle
in court. This is because, outside of litigation, a strategy of stalling may
be optimal for a defendant, and the plaintiff’s only alternative is (costly)
litigation. In this paper, I present a simple model demonstrating how
stalling occurs, derive empirical predictions from the model, show how
the model explains categories of litigation that existing models reliant
on private information cannot explain (large numbers of debt-collection
cases that are litigated, but no issues are contested), and discuss policy
implications (including the limits of prejudgment interest as a tool to
encourage settlement).
1 Introduction
Does costless settlement bargaining and no private information make out-
of-court settlement more likely or less likely? If you answered, “more likely,”
you’d be wrong. This paper explains why. As I will show, if pre-suit settlement
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bargaining is costless, then under fairly general conditions, bargaining failure
is certain. The claim that costly conflict will occur even between rational
parties with complete information has broad applicability:
Imagine a legal claim raised by a potential plaintiff against a potential
defendant. If the claimant were to file suit and take the case to trial, she
would prevail with some probability and win a judgment. Both parties know
the stakes, both know each parties’ costs of litigating the claim, and both
have estimates of the plaintiff’s likelihood of winning. What will happen?
They know what to expect from trial, and getting to trial is costly to both of
them. The conventional view is that, surely, they will settle.
Next, imagine a territorial claim raised an aggressor state against another
state. If the aggressor were to invade and prosecute the war to its conclusion,
it would capture the disputed territory with some probability. Both states
know the stakes, both know each states’ costs of fighting a war, and both have
estimates of the aggressor’s likelihood of winning. What will happen? They
know what to expect from war, and armed conflict is costly to both of them.
The conventional view is that, surely, they will settle.
Each of these scenarios describes a simple model of conflict and settlement.
In each, the obvious problem is that these models fail to predict trials and
wars, which for better or worse are empirical regularities. The political science
literature on armed conflict has called this “the puzzle of war,” and likewise
the law-and-economics literature on litigation and settlement has long dealt
with the puzzle of trial.1
The intuition that settlement is inevitable in a full-information environ-
ment is elegantly captured by Rubinstein (1982), who shows that in a game
where parties can alternate offers to split a surplus for an indefinite (even in-
finite) amount of time, the unique, subgame perfect equilibrium of the game
is for the parties to settle immediately, splitting the surplus (approximately)
evenly and incurring no real costs.2 Given the generality of this result—which
places no limits on the timing or number of offers or counteroffers—any effort
to explain litigation or other inefficiencies in a complete-information environ-
ment might seem futile.
The seeming disconnect between these predictions and reality have led
scholars to look for answers based on asymmetric information. Both of these
literatures have largely turned to asymmetric information or asymmetric be-
liefs to explain why parties to a dispute would fail to reach a settlement and
1There is a meta-puzzle here, if you will, which is why these literatures are separate. It
should be clear from the scenarios above that there is a single “puzzle of conflict” rather than
separate puzzles of war and litigation. (Perhaps lawyers are uninterested in studying war
and international relations scholars are uninterested in studying litigation.) Only recently
have Levmore and Porat (2015) begun to apply a common conceptual framework to war
and litigation.
2A 50/50 split occurs only in the limit as the parties’ discount factors approach 1. If this
condition does not hold, the split is only approximately 50/50.
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avoid the costs of open conflict. The canonical divergent-expectations model
in law and economics posits that mutual optimism of the parties may eliminate
the range of mutually agreeable settlement values (see, e.g., Priest and Klein
[1984]), and models on war and peace have turned to this device as well (see
Slantchar and Tarar [2011]). This view, however, has been criticized for lack-
ing foundations in rational behavior—if parties share common information and
know conflict is costly, then the fact of bargaining failure should lead parties
to update their beliefs about their likelihood of winning, thereby eliminating
the mutual optimism problem (see, e.g., Lee and Klerman [2015]; Slantchar
and Tarar [2011]).
Consequently, the mainstream approach has been to assume that asym-
metric information generates conflict. In law and economics, models in which
settlement offers are used by informed parties to signal private information
(Reinganum and Wilde [1986]) or by uninformed parties to screen for private
information (Bebchuk [1984]) are the workhorses of the theoretical study of
litigation and settlement. Existing contributions that specifically study set-
tlement delay, as I do below, also focus on private-information environments;
Miceli (1999) presents a model in which settlement delay is costly to plaintiffs,
and plaintiffs unobservably differ in their ability to tolerate delay. Likewise,
seminal work on war emphasizes asymmetries of information as a basis for
armed conflict (see, e.g., Fearon [1995]). Indeed, the view that war is impos-
sible in a complete-information environment is summed up in the title of a
famous paper, “War Is in the Error Term” (Gartzke [1999]).
As intuitive as asymmetric information is as an explanation for conflict—
and it certainly explains many conflicts, both legal and military—its ability to
explain many types of conflict does not survive closer inspection. As Powell
(2006) noted, “while asymmetric information may explain the early phases
of some conflicts, it does not provide a convincing account of prolonged con-
flict,” because, as Fearon (2004) observed, “after a few years of war, fight-
ers on both sides . . . typically develop accurate understandings of the other
side’s capabilities, tactics, and resolve.” For this reason, scholars such as
James Fearon (1995) and Robert Powell (2006) have developed symmetrical-
information models in which bargaining failure leads to war, despite the par-
ties’ common knowledge that war makes both sides worse off.
The same pivot toward symmetrical-information models has not occurred
in law and economics, although several papers (which I discuss below) make
important contributions in this context. The relative inattention to this con-
text should be surprising. While asymmetric information is undoubtedly an
essential feature (perhaps the essential feature) of many litigation contexts,
its role can be overstated; indeed, the hallmark of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is to create, through discovery, a symmetric-information litigation
environment. And for many disputes, even at the time the case is filed, there
is little private information. For example, in federal court alone, plaintiffs
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file thousands of cases seeking judgments to collect on defaulted debt. Nei-
ther liability nor damages is disputed, and it is hard to imagine what relevant
information either side lacks.
Likewise, claims of frivolous and nuisance-value litigation abound. While
the prevalence of such cases is hotly debated, there is no doubt that, to the ex-
tent such cases exist, they are driven by common knowledge that the plaintiff’s
claims do not merit a settlement, but the defendant’s high litigation costs will
induce a settlement regardless. Indeed, the notion that a lawsuit is “frivolous”
only makes sense in a symmetric-information environment. If there is private
information, then one can’t know whether a lawsuit is frivolous or not.
Therein lies the puzzle: these debt collection actions and frivolous lawsuits
are lawsuits. They weren’t resolved out of court, before legal fees started piling
up after the filing of a complaint. Most of these cases settle, of course, but
they do so during, not before, litigation. The parties sign their peace treaty,
so to speak, only after declaring war. Why?
This type of bargaining failure has been virtually unexplored in law and
economics. Rather, symmetrical-information models in law and economics
have mostly abstracted away from the bargaining process, instead focusing on
the extent to which a negative-expected-value (NEV) claim can nonetheless
induce a settlement for the plaintiff. See Rosenberg and Shavell (1985); Be-
bchuk (1996); Croson and Mnookin (1996); and Hubbard (2016). Consistent
with the prevailing intuition about settlement in a symmetrical-information
environment, in these models backwards induction leads to an efficient settle-
ment in the first period of the game; no real resources are consumed due to
delay or litigation activity.
Although most symmetric-information models of suit and settlement pur-
port to describe the litigation process, this is only because the model imposes
the assumption that a complaint is filed before anything else happens in the
model. But the logic of these models predicts settlements but no suits. In a
symmetrical-information environment, why would the parties wait for a filed
complaint before settling, when they could settle the claim pre-complaint and
save the cost of filing? Yet millions of lawsuits are filed each year. Are every
one of these plagued by asymmetric information or irrational parties?
Rather than imposing a priori an inability to bargain pre-suit, my model
explicitly models the pre-suit negotiation process and derives conditions under
which claims will or will not settle pre-suit. This model shows how a simple
but under-studied negotiation tactic—stalling—arises endogenously even in
full information settings where the plaintiff is bringing a positive-expected
value (PEV) claim.3 Stalling—by which I mean the strategy of continuing to
negotiate not with the goal of reaching a settlement but the goal of delaying
3The logic herein applies to NEV suits as well. But I focus on PEV claims because it is
obvious why defendants might refuse to settle NEV claims, which by definition are claims
such that the cost of going to trial exceeds plaintiff’s expected judgment at trial.
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action by one’s adversary—is a fundamental cause of bargaining failure, even in
a complete-information environment with perfectly rational actors. My model
explains why parties in a symmetric-information context would ever resort to
litigation (which is costly) rather than settle without a suit even being filed.
Contrary to intuition, the existence of a symmetric-information (or even full-
information) environment does not guarantee pre-suit settlement. Instead, the
costly and inefficient filing of suit is the equilibrium outcome in this model for
a wide range of realistic parameter values.
This model also provides a theoretical foundation for simpler models of
settlement used in many contexts, such as the single, take-it-or-leave-it set-
tlement offer limited by an exogenous bargaining-power parameter. See, e.g.,
Hubbard (2016). And the fact that in many circumstances pre-suit settle-
ment is impossible means that models that simply ignore the possibility of
pre-suit settlement may not be so unrealistic after all. Further, I show that
under conditions relevant to the modeling of litigation (i.e., finite-time bar-
gaining with many opportunities for settlement), models with discounting of
the future but without bargaining costs (such as the Rubinstein (1982) model),
and models with no discounting but with bargaining costs (such as Bebchuk
(1996)) are outcome-equivalent. Indeed, many important works on bargaining
with repeated offers and counteroffers, including Rubinstein (1982), Binmore,
Shaked, and Sutton (1989), Bebchuk (1996), and Schwartz and Wickelgren
(2009) nest as special cases of the general model I describe herein.
I have found three papers that focus on settlement bargaining in complete
information contexts in litigation. The results in this paper build upon and
generalize these papers. Spier (1992) was the first to note the stalling phe-
nomenon in the complete-information context. Further, Spier (1992) is one of
the few papers to recognize that litigation is the outside option to pre-suit bar-
gaining and formally model this relationship, although her paper was focused
on the incomplete-information setting and addressed the complete-information
setting only briefly. Thus, few results emerged.
Schwartz and Wickelgren (2009) showed that even in a full-information
environment, an optimal strategy of delay can prevent settlement. Schwartz
and Wickelgren (2009) argue that NEV claims can never generate nuisance
settlements for plaintiffs. In their model, an indefinite number of offers and
counter-offers can be made costlessly during litigation. Because of this, they
argue, the plaintiff will not be able to extract a settlement during litigation
large enough to make the initial threat to sue credible. This result challenges
the claim that nuisance litigation exists at all, let alone is a serious problem.
While this model is internally valid, it has difficulty gaining traction as a model
of litigation rather than a model of negotiation; it models costly litigation
activity as the plaintiff’s outside option, but this is only true before a suit is
filed. Once litigation is filed, the parties incur litigation costs regardless of
the progress of negotiations, and the true “outside option” for the plaintiff
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is dropping the suit. For this reason, my model incorporates Schwartz and
Wickelgren (2009) as a model of pre-suit negotiation, rather than as a model
of litigation.
The third paper is Anderlini, Felli, and Immordino (2017), which reaches a
similar conclusion—settlement failure is possible even in a complete-information
context—but via a different path. Anderlini, Felli, and Immordino (2017) show
that if bargaining costs for the parties are sufficiently high, and the distribu-
tion of costs between the parties does not correspond to their bargaining power
in dividing the surplus from settlement, then they will not reach a settlement,
and the plaintiff will file a lawsuit. Nonetheless, our models are complemen-
tary, in that my model nests their results by endogenizes bargaining power
and allowing pre-suit bargaining to be costless.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, I describe the
core components of a model game that captures the key elements of bargaining
in the shadow of conflict. I show how the model maps cleanly onto litigation
(and conflict settings more generally), at least where complete information
is a useful approximation of reality. In Section 3, I present results. I show
how a simple, flexible model of multi-stage bargaining in and out of litigation
can generate distinct and novel predictions that jibe with our intuitions about
real-world litigation.
In Section 4, I present two settings where this model might have particu-
lar descriptive or prescriptive bite. First, I note that routine debt-collection
actions are a sizable portion of courts’ dockets, even though such disputes of-
ten involve little or no private information. Stalling, however, easily explains
why such cases, which otherwise seem like obvious candidates for out-of-court
settlement, end up being litigated. Using data from two very different court
systems—courts of Taiwan and the US federal courts—I show how empirical
patterns in these two jurisdictions are consistent with the predictions of my
model. Second, I note an important legal mechanism for discouraging stalling:
prejudgment interest. By ensuring that the present value of plaintiff’s claim
cannot be diminished by stalling, prejudgment interest is a potentially pow-
erful tool for reducing stalling. I survey the wide variation in state law on
prejudgment interest in the US, noting ways in which this variation could
facilitate empirical testing of the model and ways in which the model may
counsel for changing the rules governing prejudgment interest as a remedy.
Section 5 concludes.
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2 The Model
2.1 Formal Model
The model is a bargaining game with two parts, Stage 1 (in the litigation
context, pre-suit) and Stage 2 (post-filing), and two parties, P (i.e., plaintiff)
and D (i.e., defendant). In each stage, the parties exchange settlement offers
and counteroffers. If at any time a party accepts the other party’s offer,
the game ends and the parties’ payoffs are determined by the terms of the
settlement. The first stage of the game may be indefinite in duration or have
a finite duration; the second stage has finite duration.
In each stage there is an inside option and an outside option. An outside
option is an option that the option-holder can exercise at any time in lieu of
making an offer or counteroffer.4 An inside option is an option that triggers
when the parties neither reach a settlement nor exercise an outside option
before the end of the stage.
In Stage 1, the inside option results in the end of the game and no transfers.
Each party keeps its initial endowments. The outside option is held by P . The
outside option is to end Stage 1 and begin Stage 2. Exercising this option may
be costly: P must pay a fee of F ≥ 0 when exercising the option. In Stage
1, bargaining may entail some cost to each party or may be costless. The
payoffs from P ’s outside option will be endogenously determined, based on
the equilibrium strategies in Stage 2. Call the equilibrium payment from D
to P in the Stage 2 subgame W . Then the payoff to P from exercising the
outside option is W − F , and the payoff to D is −W .
If P exercises her outside option, Stage 2 of the game begins. In Stage 2,
the inside option is an event (i.e., trial) that results in an expected transfer of
piJ from D to P . The outside option is held by D. The outside option is for
D to transfer J to P , at which point the game ends. (Think of this a paying
a default judgment to the plaintiff for the full value, J , of her claim.)5
In each stage, the players alternate moving first each turn. To be more
precise, divide each stage j (for j ∈ {1, 2}) into Nj + 1 turns, numbered
0 through Nj. Throughout, the parties may (or may not) discount future
payoffs. Player i has a per-turn discount factor δi ∈ [0, 1], or equivalently a
per-turn discount rate βi such that δi = 1− βi.
4Note that for simplicity of notation, I assume that a plaintiff indifferent between ex-
ercising an outside option and not exercising it will not. I assume that a party indifferent
between settling and not settling will settle. These assumptions dealing with knife-edge
conditions allow me to define equilibrium conditions precisely (with equalities rather than
inequalities), but otherwise do not affect the analysis.
5It is not relevant in the complete-information context, but in the incomplete information
context it is worth noting that the plaintiff in litigation has an outside option as well, which
is to drop the suit. This option is valuable if discovery reveals that the claim has negative
settlement value. See Cornell (1992) and Grundfest and Huang (2006).
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In Stage 1, P moves first. In Stage 2, D moves first.6 P makes a settlement
offer, or, in Stage 1, exercises her outside option (e.g., files suit). The offer
to settle made in turn n is labeled Sn and proposes a payment from D to P
of Sn. If P makes an offer, then D may accept or reject it. If the offer is
accepted, the game ends and D pays Sn to P . If the offer is rejected, the next
turn begins and the parties switch roles; D makes an offer, which P will either
accept or reject, or, in Stage 2, D exercises his outside option (i.e., accepts a
default judgment). The exception is that if the offer in the final turn (turn Nj)
is rejected, the game ends and the parties receive payoffs given by the inside
option for the relevant stage of the game. Players have an equal number of
opportunities to make an offer; thus, Nj + 1 is even.
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In each stage, there is some cost to continuing to negotiate. In the first
stage, this bargaining cost is bni ≥ 0 for turn n and party i. If the parties
have neither settled nor triggered an outside option at the end of turn n, each
party i pays the cost bni for continuing to bargaining in the next turn. For
simplicity, the results below assume constant per-turn bargaining costs, such
that costs for party i are bni = bi for all n ∈ {0, . . . , N1}.
In the second stage, costs are strictly positive because the parties bear the
ongoing costs of litigation.8 In the second stage, per-turn litigation costs are
cni for turn n and party i. The total remaining cost to party i as of turn n is
Cni =
N2∑
k=n
δk−ncki (1)
Thus, the total cost of litigating through to trial (i.e., Stage 2 ends with the
inside option triggering) for party i is Ci ≡ C0i. Thus, the cost parameters
of this model can be made comparable to litigation costs in other models
by noting that total litigation costs are C ≡ Cp + Cd, and C represents the
maximum surplus from settlement during litigation. For simplicity, except
where otherwise noted, the results below assume constant per-turn litigation
costs, such that costs for party i are cni = ci for all n ∈ {0, . . . , N2}.
A comparison of the parties’ inside and outside options in the two stages
of the game appears in Table 1. A simplified representations of the game tree
appears in Figure 2. I note here that although the model has been tailored to
6This is to ensure that the player with the outside option can exercise it right away. The
stalling dynamic, however, does not depend on who moves first.
7The structure of this sub-game reflects the logic of Schwartz and Wickelgren (2009).
They argue that a plaintiff who has made a settlement demand cannot decide whether
or not to invoke her outside option until she hears defendant’s response, and in real life,
defendant’s response need not be limited to “I accept” or “I reject”; instead, the defendant’s
response could be a counteroffer. For this reason, I employ a version of an alternating offer
game is one in which the plaintiff can only invoke the outside option in every other period—
only after the periods in which the defendant has the right to make a settlement proposal.
8Otherwise, however, there is no restriction on the relationship between bi and ci in the
model.
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the litigation context (which is isomorphic with some other conflict settings,
as I note below), it is easy to generalize this model to a game in which both
parties have outside options in both stages, and payoffs from inside and outside
options can take any values. Such a generalized version of the model would
allow one to represent any bargaining environment with repeated offers and
counteroffers in the presence of inside and outside options. The goal here,
however, is to show how a fairly basic model can unify distinct models used
in the law and economics literature and generate new results and predictions
on bargaining outcomes and bargaining behavior in the specific context of
litigation.
2.2 The Game as Litigation
This structure has a natural interpretation in the context of litigation. The
first stage of the game is the pre-litigation environment. The (potential) plain-
tiff P and (potential) defendant D have a finite amount of time (N1 + 1 turns)
in which to reach a settlement before the statute of limitation period for plain-
tiff’s claim expires. During this time, the parties may settle, or plaintiff may
exercise her outside option, which is to initiate a lawsuit by filing a civil action
(which entails costs F associated with initiating suit and filing a complaint).
If neither of these outcomes occurs before the expiration of the limitations
period, plaintiff’s claim is extinguished, and the game ends.
The filing of the complaint triggers the second stage of the game. Dur-
ing this stage, the parties continue to bargain, but bargaining is more costly
because litigation costs accrue as long as bargaining continues. At any time,
the defendant can exercise her outside option, which is to default and pay
the plaintiff the entire judgment demand J . If neither settlement nor default
occurs, the inside option of trial occurs. With some probability pi, plaintiff
wins and the defendant pays the judgment demand. Thus, the parties know
that the expected judgment at trial is piJ .
2.3 The Game as International Conflict
Although the discussion throughout this paper focuses on the setting of litiga-
tion and settlement, the structure of the model also has a natural interpretation
in the context of international conflict. The first stage of the game is the period
without open war. The powerful aggressor state P and the defending state D
have a period of time in which to settle (N1 +1 turns). During this period, the
parties may reach a settlement, or the aggressor state may exercise its outside
option, which is to invade. An invasion requires costly mobilization efforts (F )
by the aggressor. If neither of these outcomes occurs, the inside option (if the
game has a finite duration) is for the game to end without conflict.
The invasion triggers the second stage of the game. During this stage, the
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parties continue to bargain, but bargaining is more costly because costs of
armed conflict accrue as long as the war continues. At any time, the defender
can exercise its outside option, which is to capitulate and transfer to the ag-
gressor its entire territorial claim (J). If neither settlement nor capitulation
occurs, the inside option of a military victory occurs. With some probability
(pi), the aggressor wins the war and the defender cedes the territorial claim.
2.4 Key Features of the Model
This model captures key elements of the process of bargaining in the shadow of
conflict and incorporates fundamental concepts of multi-period games, includ-
ing alternating offers, outside options, and inside options. Combining these
characteristics allows me to capture several real-world features of bargaining
in the shadow conflict:
First, the model allows for parties to exchange offers. Each party in the
model has an opportunity to make a settlement offer, and the other party has
the opportunity to accept the offer or reject it and make a counteroffer. The
number of opportunities to make and respond to offers may not be unlimited,
but this model allows for many—possibly indefinitely many—settlement offers.
The mechanics of offer and counteroffer in the game above are identical to
the canonical alternating-offer game in Rubinstein (1982), in which parties
negotiate to split a bargaining surplus between them.
Second, settlement negotiation may occur inside or outside of litigation.
The model’s structure is sufficiently flexible to account for key differences in
the two settings.
Third, each party is free to exercise whatever alternatives to negotiation are
available. In other words, the model must account for outside options, or what
is often referred to in the negotiation literature as each party’s BATNA (best
alternative to negotiated agreement). In the pre-suit setting, the defendant
has no meaningful outside option, but the plaintiff has one: initiating litigation
(although filing suit may itself be costly).9 Indeed, it is the threat to invoke
this outside option that often frames real-life attempts at pre-suit settlement.
In the post-filing context, the parties’ roles are flipped. The plaintiff has no
meaningful outside option (other than abandoning the suit, which is equivalent
to accepting a settlement offer of zero), but the defendant has one: paying a
default judgment. This may be preferable to settlement in contexts where
litigation costs affect settlement values; see Hubbard (2016) for a discussion
and formal treatment of this phenomenon.
9It may be possible to treat capitulation—paying the entire J to P—as D’s outside
option in Stage 1, but note that outside of litigation, D has no way to force P accept. Thus,
while a pre-suit settlement for the full J is possible, there is no outside option for D in this
context.
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Fourth, bargaining failure triggers inside options distinct from the parties’
outside options. As Schwartz and Wickelgren (2009) point out, one can dis-
tinguish between outside options, which parties invoke instead of negotiating,
and inside options, which trigger when parties negotiate but fail to settle. In
the pre-suit negotiation context, if the parties neither settle nor invoke an out-
side option, the result (upon the expiration of the statute of limitations) is
an effective settlement of zero. In the post-filing context, however, the inside
option is trial.10
Identifying real-world inside and outside options as such is doubly reveal-
ing. First, as shown above, it lays bare the identical basic structure of litigation
and war as a two-stage bargaining game with virtually identical patterns of
inside and outside options. Second, inside and outside options affect bargain-
ing very differently. Neither the literature on war and peace nor the literature
on litigation and settlement has recognized that in the first stage of the game,
conflict is the outside option, but in the second stage of the game, conflict is
the inside option. This difference is subtle—but it is why stalling can prevent
settlement in the pre-suit context but not in the post-filing context.
Finally, and crucially, negotiations may be protracted but cannot go on
forever. Pre-suit negotiations, for example, must lead to settlement or a law-
suit before the statute of limitations period for the plaintiff’s claim expires.
Post-filing negotiations are bounded by deadlines for dispositive motions or
trial (although of course such deadlines are, in practice, themselves movable
based on the progress of negotiations).
Here, the model offers a novel approach that allows me to capture both
the extensive back-and-forth of bargaining and the time-constrained nature of
“bargaining on the courthouse steps” in a simple way, something that existing
approaches do not do. Existing approaches present a dilemma. On the one
hand, it seems natural to employ a bargaining model that allows an arbitrar-
ily large number of offers and counteroffers. Elegant limiting results (as the
number of turns goes to infinity), such as the equilibrium division of surplus
in Rubinstein (1982), are well established.
On the other hand, these limiting cases imply that the parties have infi-
nite time during which to bargain, which is clearly unrealistic. Jarndyce v.
10Inside and outside options are absent from the basic Rubinstein model, but of course in
reality they set the parameters for bargaining. (See Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton (1989) for
an application of the Rubinstein model to a context where an outside option was available
to a party.) Models of war and litigation abound with inside and outside options, although
they are rarely labeled as such. Exceptions include Schwartz and Wickelgren (2009), who
introduce the formal distinction between inside and outside options to the study of litigation
and settlement, and Cornell (1992) and Grundfest and Huang (2006), who note that for
the plaintiff in litigation, the ability to drop the suit is a valuable outside option. (For
simplicity, my model ignores the plaintiff’s outside option during litigation, given that under
complete information this option is never exercised. But in a richer model with incomplete
information, the existence of this option affects the settlement value of the plaintiff’s claim.
See Cornell (1992) and Grundfest and Huang (2006) for discussion.)
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Jarndyce11 aside, most legal disputes must end in finite time; an unfiled legal
claim expires when the statute of limitation period runs, while a filed lawsuit is
subject to all manner of deadlines. Further, infinite time to negotiate implies
that inside options are worthless, since their present discounted value is zero.
This is a serious problem, given that the parties’ inside option in litigation is
trial! In short, understanding bargaining outcomes—and bargaining failure—
in realistic settings requires a more realistic time horizon for bargaining.
To escape this dilemma, I offer a small but consequential innovation in my
modeling. As the length of the game in turns goes to infinity, I hold the length
of the game in time constant, so that even with an infinite number of turns,
the game ends in finite time. The formal move is to hold the present value of
payoffs in the final turn of a stage fixed (i.e., δ
Nj
i ) fixed as Nj goes to infinity.
Note that holding δ
Nj
i constant ensures that the model captures the fact
that future payoffs may be discounted, even though δi goes to 1 as Nj → ∞.
Further, note that even as δi → 1, it remains the case that one party’s discount
rate βi may be much higher, relatively speaking, than the other party’s. To
allow for this possibility even as δi → 1 for each party, I define α ≡ βdβp+βd ,
which is the relative “impatience” of D compared to P .
My next move here is to recognize that as N goes to infinity, the game can
be represented in continuous, rather than discrete, time. The discrete-time
discount factor δ corresponds to the continuous time discount rate ρ, such
that ρ = − ln(δ). We can thus define T to be the maximum time in years for
bargaining, and thus ρi is the per-year discount rate for party i. For example,
if a lawsuit will last T years until trial, then the present value of the inside
option of trial for the plaintiff is e−ρpTpiJ . Note that this also requires that
total costs be expressed as a continuous function of time: rather than a per-
turn litigation cost function of ci, we define costs as a function of time ci(t)
such that total litigation costs do not change as the number of turns goes to
infinity, and likewise for Stage 1 bargaining costs.12
This move to continuous time yields several benefits: (1) it allows arbi-
trarily many bargaining periods while ensuring that parameters of the model
(time in years T ; annual discount rate ρ) are expressed in quantities that, as a
practical matter, can be empirically measured; (2) it simplifies the characteri-
zation of results; and (3) it permits solving for interior solutions for the timing
of the exercise of outside options in the midst of Stage 1 or Stage 2 (which
arises in equilibrium when bargaining or litigation costs vary over time for the
parties).
* * *
11Charles Dickens, Bleak House (1853).
12Thus, we have ci(t) such that
T∫
0
e−ρitci(t)dt = Ci, with changes for bi mutatis mutandis.
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In sum, this paper advances our understanding of dispute resolution through
its attention to so many features of bargaining. The model is able to capture
so many aspects of bargaining in a simple way by means of a small but useful
methodological innovation: allowing the number of offers and counteroffers
to approach infinity in finite time. As I show below, this identifies impor-
tant sources of bargaining failure even in the complete-information context
and generates empirical predictions that help explain otherwise unexpected
patterns in court data.
3 Results
The intuitions for the solutions to the model are simple, while the formal proofs
are tedious, so I present intuitions here and relegate proofs to the Appendix.
The solution concept is subgame perfect sequential equilibrium, and the game
is solved by backwards induction. As noted in Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton
(1989), a key result in alternating-offer games is that outside options do not
affect equilibrium settlements unless the option-holder prefers the outside op-
tion to the equilibrium that would exist in the absence of the option. Thus,
our first step is to examine post-filing (Stage 2) settlement negotiations in the
absence of an outside option.
Our first result is that if we ignore Stage 1 and the outside option of default
by D, the model replicates standard results in the bargaining literature.
Proposition 1: Equilibrium with inside option and no outside option,
as the number of bargaining opportunities goes to infinity in finite
time. Let Wi = (0, 0) for i ∈ {p, d}; i.e., ignore outside options. Let the
number of turns N go to infinity, but hold constant the amount of time that
elapses between turn 0 and turn N . (To do this, define δ ≡ δp+δd
2
and hold
δN constant.) The unique subgame perfect equilibrium is that P offers and D
accepts settlement S0 in turn 0, such that:
S0 =
1
2
T∫
0
e−ρt(cd(t)− cp(t))dt+ e−ρTpiJ (2)
where ρ ≡ ρp+ρd
2
.
If ρ = ρp = ρd, The unique subgame perfect equilibrium is that P offers
and D accepts S0 such that:
S0 =
1
2
(Cd − Cp) + e−ρTpiJ (3)
Remark. Here we see the expected result: the parties split the surplus, and
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party D transfers the present value of P ’s inside option to P .13
Corollary 1.1: Shares of surplus when parties’ discount rates differ.
If the parties’ discount rates differ, the split of the surplus favors the more
patient party. Plaintiff’s share σp of the surplus can be expressed as
σp =
(
ρd
ρp + ρd
)(
1 +
ρp(cde
−ρdT
2 + cpe
−ρpT
2 )(e
−ρdT
2 − e−ρpT2 )
cpρp(1− e
−ρpT
2 ) + cdρp(1− e
−ρdT
2 )
)
(4)
How does this result in continuous but finite time relate to the limiting
case in discrete but infinite time for a fixed surplus, as in Rubinstein (1982)?
The limit as T →∞ is
σp =
ρd
ρp + ρd
≈ α (5)
which is the limiting result for surplus shares in Rubinstein (1982).
The limit as T → 0 is
lim
T→0
σp =
1
2
(6)
which is the result for games, such as Bebchuk (1996), where the parties al-
ternate making offers and there is no time discounting. The general case of
positive discount rates and finite time, therefore, nests these existing results
as limiting cases.
Remark. One can interpret α to be the equilibrium or “observed” bargaining
power of Player P . Although the alternating offer game in some sense gives
equal bargaining power to each player—each player has an equal number of
opportunities to make offers—the relative impatience of the parties has the
effect of endongenously determining what can be interpreted as the relative
bargaining power of the parties.
* * *
Given this outcome, we can now consider the impact of an outside option
of default by defendant.
Proposition 2: Optimal Timing of Default. In Stage 2, default will occur
immediately or not at all. Cases without default will settle immediately. The
value of the settlement will depend on whether default after period 0, but
before trial, would have been optimal for D in the absence of settlement.
Remark. In the absence of settlement, the optimal timing of default is not
obvious. Earlier default saves litigation costs, but if ρ > 0, later default
13Proof of Proposition 1 is omitted. The primary proof is by induction and is tedious and
unilluminating. Elegant proofs for infinite-horizon games that nest in this framework for
N →∞ appear in Rubinstein (1982) and Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton (1989). The result
in Proposition 1 is identical to Conclusion 2 in Rubinstein (1982), with the exception that
it allows for the inside option.
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reduces the present value of the judgment that must be paid; in principle, the
judgment could be so large that delay is ideal.
* * *
The post-filing subgame looks very much like familiar models of settlement.
The parties avoid litigation costs and settle at the earliest opportunity. The
pre-suit portion of the game (Stage 1), while very similar in structure, has
entirely different equilibrium behavior. This is because litigation and trial are
no longer the inside option, but the outside option.
Proposition 3: Pre-Suit No-Settlement Conditions. Assume that the
outside option is sufficiently valuable to the plaintiff that the plaintiff is willing
to invoke it if bargaining fails. There will be no settlement in Stage 1, and
plaintiff will immediately file suit without attempting to settle, if
(1− δpδd)(W − F ) + δdb1p − b0d > 0 (7)
For N1 → ∞, taking limits and using continuous time, the condition for pre-
suit bargaining failure becomes
ρ(W − F ) +
(
1
2
)
bp >
(
1
2
)
bd (8)
The left side of Expression (8) represents the cost to P (and the benefit to
D) of delay, in terms of diminished present value of the outside option, plus
P ’s cost of continuing to negotiate. (Note that the bargaining cost is halved
because settlement means that the parties split their cost savings.) The right
side of Expression (8) represents the benefit to P (and the cost to D) of delay,
in terms of D’s cost of continuing to negotiate.
Expressed as a relationship between the discount rate ρ and the relative
bargaining costs of the parties, this condition is
ρ >
(
1
2
)
bd − bp
W − F (9)
The relationship between ρ, bd−bp
W−F , and bargaining failure is illustrated in Figure
3.
Remark. This model generates several clear, empirical predictions.The first
and most fundamental prediction of this model is that filed lawsuits will arise
even in disputes between rational parties in an environment of complete infor-
mation. In other words, war is not always in the “error term.” In addition,
we can draw from Expression (8) the following predictions:
• Bargaining Costs. If the parties’ costs of continuing to bargain are sym-
metrical (bp(t) = bd(t)), and discount rates are positive, settlement never
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occurs in Stage 1. P files suit immediately. In pratice, if there are no
penalties (reputational or otherwise) to stalling, such that the bargain-
ing costs of defendants do not exceed the bargaining costs of plaintiffs,
then settlements should occur in the context of filed litigation only. A
lack of reputational penalties to stalling is likely to exist in “one-shot”
interactions between parties. Conversely, the presence of reputational
and repeat-play factors should predict pre-filing settlement.
• Discount rates and settlement value. Because ρ and W are sources of the
benefit from stalling, as ρ or W rise, the equilibrium may shift from pre-
suit settlement to stalling. Thus, high-expected-settlement-value claims
and high discount rates should be associated with immediate filing rather
than pre-suit settlement. If, say, liquidity constrained parties have higher
effective discount rates, then liquidity constraints would (counterintu-
itively) predict litigation.
• Filing Costs. Note that although the presence of F , which means that
there is surplus from settling pre-suit, does not prevent bargaining failure
from precipitating suit even in an environment of complete information,
the value of F is not irrelevant to the model. A higher F makes it
more likely that the parties will reach a settlement in Stage 1. Thus,
higher filing fees have a double effect on litigation rates: first, the effect
of discouraging plaintiff with low-settlement value claims from asserting
those claims at all, and second, the effect of shifting settlements from
litigation to pre-litigation. Nonetheless, a rise in F means that pre-
suit settlements have lower payoffs for plaintiffs than they would have
received in litigation with a lower F .
Corollary 3.1: Bargaining Failure when Bargaining Is Costless. As-
sume that negotiation costs are zero and the parties discount the future (bi = 0
and δi < 1 for i ∈ {p, d}). In this game, the surplus from settlement in Stage
1 is the savings from plaintiff avoiding the fee F for filing suit. Nonetheless,
the subgame perfect equilibrium is for plaintiff to exercise the outside option
immediately at a cost of F , at which point D pays W to P .
Remark. The intuition that costless bargaining necessarily facilitates settle-
ment is wrong. If bargaining is costless, then delay cannot hurt the defendant,
and if the parties discount the future, delay reduces the value of the plaintiff’s
outside option. If plaintiff were to offer to accept Spre−suit0 = W−F as a settle-
ment rather than filing suit immediately, the defendant would be strictly better
off refusing settlement, and then in turn 1 counteroffering Spre−suit1 = δ(W−F ),
which is the present value of plaintiff invoking her outside option in turn 2.
Given that plaintiff can do no better than this, she will accept. But this, of
course, is worse than if she simply exercised her outside option in turn 0. For
this reason, pre-suit settlement is impossible.
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4 Applications
4.1 Debt Collection
Stalling may explain an otherwise puzzling pattern in court data. A substantial
share of courts’ civil dockets is composed of debt collection actions. Many
debt collection actions involve situations where there is a debt of (usually)
undisputed amount that the debtor has failed to pay. Thus, these cases are
good candidates for a category of litigation involving little private information.
To be sure, many contract actions may involve information asymmetries for
which litigation and discovery are a predictable outcome. But this possibility
is undermined by the fact that for some categories of debt collection cases,
rates of default judgment are sky-high—and recall that default judgment is a
final judgment in favor of the plaintiff that the court enters when the defendant
fails to respond to the complaint or otherwise defend the case at all.14
This pattern appears in US federal court data on cases brought by the US
government to collect defaulted student loans and to recover overpayments of
government benefits—two categories of cases that are separately designated in
administrative data provided by the Administrative Office of the US Courts.
(See Hubbard [2017] for details on this data set.) Among these cases, thou-
sands of which are filed per year, 48% end in a default judgment (compared
to 3% of other cases). To reiterate, half of all filed cases in these categories
end with the defendant contesting neither liability nor damages. Why didn’t
they simply settle out of court?
Nor is this phenomenon unique to the US. For example, administrative data
from the courts of Taiwan (described in detail in Chang and Hubbard [2018])
replicates this pattern: loan contract and debt payment dispute categories
comprise a surprisingly large set of cases and have extremely high rates of
default judgments (about 41% of all actions end in default judgment, four
times the rate for other actions). See Figure 4. Thus, it is unlikely that
particular features of US law or legal practice explain what we see in the US
data.
These facts don’t fit existing explanations. If these disputes are becoming
filed lawsuits, it is not because they are “close” cases, as we might expect from
divergent expectations models, or because discovery is necessary for revealing
private information. The juxtaposition of routine litigation and routine default
means that debt collection cases provide a context where the usual explana-
tions for settlement failure in US litigation don’t apply.
But the logic of the model above explains this pattern easily. In a case
where a debt is owed and it’s undisputed—especially when it’s disputed—the
defendant can benefit from delay: the outcome is certain to be unfavorable,
14See, e.g., Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55.
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and anything that delays the inevitable allows the defendant to retain use of
whatever assets are in jeopardy of being used to satisfy the debt. Attempts
by the plaintiff to negotiate an out-of-court settlement simply play into the
defendant’s strategy of delay. So the plaintiff must sue and expend real re-
sources. Once haled into court, the defendant not longer benefits from delay;
answering the complaint and responding to discovery or a motion for summary
judgment is costly. And since the facts are undisputed, default is cheaper even
than settlement (and may buy the defendant a few more months time).
4.2 Prejudgment Interest
Prejudgment interest is a potential component of a damages award that com-
pensates the plaintiff for the loss of the time value of money due to the delay
between the plaintiff’s injury and the award of damages. If it works perfectly
to compensate the plaintiff in this way, it should eliminate any discounting of
the expected trial award piJ by the parties.15 This poses the question: Doesn’t
the existence of prejudgment interest render concerns about stalling moot?
The answer is a resounding “sometimes.” This is a function of both legal
doctrine and the implications of the model above.
As a matter of doctrine, rules governing the award of prejudgment in-
terest vary dramatically from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, with only certain
categories of cases, involving certain circumstances, brought under the law of
certain states, being subject to fully compensatory prejudgment interest. In
some states, not all categories of claims are eligible for prejudgment interest.
For example, in Illinois, only breach of contract claims involving liquidated
damages are entitled to prejudgment interest. And in some states, prejudg-
ment interest does not accrue during periods in which stalling might occur.
For example, in California, prejudgment interest for unliquidated damages in
contract actions accrues only after suit is filed.16
Thus, we might expect that pre-suit settlement is less likely in disputes
governed by law that either does not provide for prejudgment interest or does
not provide for prejudgment interest during the pre-suit stage. As a prescrip-
tive matter, if we deem pre-suit settlement desirable (and we might not), one
tool for promoting it is to apply prejudgment interest to the entire pre-suit
period.
But an important implication of the model is that even if prejudgment
interest perfectly counteracts parties’ discounting of a future judgment, pre-
15It should also eliminate the possibility of the defendant strategically delaying default
during litigation. If prejudgment interest perfectly preserves the present value of the judg-
ment, default occurs immediately or never.
16For discussion, see Business & Commercial Litigation in the Federal Courts §§44:31,
50:50 (3d ed.). For a 50-state survey, see Post Judgment Interest / Prejudgment Interest /
Punitive Damages / United States and Canada 2010 (Munich Re 2010).
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judgment interest may not eliminate bargaining failure due to stalling. This
is because the settlement value of a filed action (W ) is not solely a function
of the expected judgment when the parties’ litigation costs are asymmetrical.
Prejudgment interest eliminates discounting of the expected judgment but not
litigation costs. If we take this into account and substitute Expression (3) into
Expression (8), we obtain the following condition for bargaining failure:
ρ >
bd − bp
Cd − Cp (10)
Take a plausible scenario, where bargaining costs are equal (bd = bp)but liti-
gation cost asymmetries favor the plaintiff (Cd > Cp). Under these conditions,
even with prejudgment interest, the plaintiff will file suit in equilibrium. Thus,
even perfectly compensatory prejudgment interest cannot eliminate the effect
that a stalling strategy has on pre-suit bargaining failure.
5 Conclusion
There is a crucial difference between the plaintiff P and the defendant D
in litigation: when a settlement or trial occurs, it is D who pays, and P who
receives. This means that, if the parties discount the future, then all else equal,
D benefits from delay and P suffers. It is only the presence of continuation
costs that creates a tradeoff for D: the benefit from delaying payment against
the costs from continuing to negotiate.
This asymmetry between plaintiffs and defendants means that the existence
of an outside option affects settlement differently depending on who holds the
option. In Stage 1, bargaining failure may occur even though it imposes real
costs on the parties: plaintiff incurs the cost F of filing suit, even though
both parties would prefer to split the surplus from saving F . The reason
that they may not is that if the plaintiff attempts to bargain to a settlement,
defendant gains by stalling if the benefits of delay exceed the costs of continued
bargaining. Settlement, in other words, is not subgame perfect, even though
it is first-best.
In Stage 2, the presence of the option to default does not lead to bargaining
failure, except in the uninteresting sense that D may default immediately,
rather than settle immediately. If D does not benefit from defaulting, the
parties settle immediately for an amount that reflects the present value of the
inside option and splits saved litigation costs. If D benefits from defaulting,
but does not benefit from delay, he will default right away. And if D benefits
from delaying exercise of his outside option, he will do so in the absence of
settlement; but knowing this, the parties will settle immediately for an amount
that reflects the present value of D’s future default.
This paper’s analysis of the stalling phenomenon is not purely academic.
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The model predicts that for wide ranges of realistic parameter values (for
example, for every case with equal pre-suit bargaining costs for P and D),
bargaining failure and immediate and costly filing of litigation is the equilib-
rium outcome. The model explains the prevalence of categories of litigation,
such as uncontested debt collection actions, that cannot be explained by pre-
vailing models of suit and settlement. In this way, it prompts us to reconsider
the possible tools for encouraging the more efficient settlement of cases out of
court.
A Proofs and Additional Results
Corollary 1.2: Shares of surplus when parties’ discount rates differ.
Given that total surplus from settlement is
Cp + Cd =
T∫
0
e−ρptcp(t)dt+
T∫
0
e−ρdtcd(t)dt (11)
we have that the plaintiff’s share of the total surplus is
σp =
1
2
T∫
0
e−ρt(cd(t)− cp(t))dt+
T∫
0
e−ρptcp(t)dt
T∫
0
e−ρptcp(t)dt+
T∫
0
e−ρdtcd(t)dt
(12)
If costs arise at a fixed rate, such that cp(t) = cp and cd(t) = cd, then
plaintiff’s share of the surplus can be expressed as
σp =
(
ρd
ρp + ρd
)(
1 +
ρp(cde
−ρdT
2 + cpe
−ρpT
2 )(e
−ρdT
2 − e−ρpT2 )
cpρp(1− e
−ρpT
2 ) + cdρp(1− e
−ρdT
2 )
)
(13)
The remainder of the corollary follows from Expression (13), with the aid
of L’Hospital’s rule to calculate the limit as T → 0.
Proposition 2: Proof. The present-value payoffs when a defendant who
defaults on turn n are (δnJ − (Cp − δnCnp),−δnJ − (Cd − δnCnd)).
In continuous time, which is suitable as the number of turns goes to infinity,
the defendant’s payoff from default at time n is
Vd(n) = −e−ρnJ +
T∫
n
e−ρtcd(t)dt (14)
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The first-order condition for the optimal time to default is
ρJ = cd(n
∗) (15)
The second-order condition for the optimal time to default is
c′d(n
∗) > 0 (16)
When the first-order condition, and its corresponding second-order condition,
are satisfied, then n∗ is the optimal time to default so long as
Vd(n
∗) > Sn∗ =
1
2
T∫
n∗
e−ρt(cd(t)− cp(t))dt+ e−ρTpiJ (17)
where SN∗ is the equilibrium settlement in the subgame without outside op-
tions beginning in turn n∗. In other words, default at n∗ must be preferable to
what would otherwise be the equilibrium settlement at n∗. Given the prospect
of a future default, the parties will settle at time 0 for
Sdef0 =
1
2
n∗∫
0
e−ρt(cd(t)− cp(t))dt+ e−ρn∗J (18)
Remark. Note that if prejudgment interest perfectly preserves the present
value of the judgment, then ρ = 0, and we have
Vd(n) = −J +
T∫
n
e−ρtcd(t)dt (19)
and the first-order condition for the optimal time to default is
∂Vd
∂n
= −e−ρncd(n) < 0 (20)
so default occurs immediately or never. (And if default does not occur imme-
diately, it is never optimal, and thus has no effect on settlement.) Given that
default concedes the amount demanded, the award of prejudgment interest
may be a reasonable assumption here.
Proposition 3: Proof. As before, we begin our consideration of the pre-suit
context by considering the equilibrium in the absence of an outside option.
The inside option in Stage 1 has payoff zero for both parties. Thus, there is
nothing to gain from P attempting to negotiate a settlement other than the
nuisance value to D of avoiding negotiations:
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Sps−zoo0 = (αBd − (1− α)Bp,−αBd + (1− α)Bp) (21)
Sps−zoo0 =
1
2
T∫
0
e−ρt(bd(t)− bp(t))dt (22)
Where I define the total remaining cost to party i as of turn n is
Bni =
N1∑
k=n
δk−nbki (23)
such that the cost to party i of bargaining through the end of Stage 1 (i.e.,
bargaining until the inside option triggers) is Bi = B0i.
If the value of the outside option to plaintiff is less than this amount, the
outside option is irrelevant, and the parties settle for this amount. But so long
as the settlement value of plaintiff’s claim in litigation is larger than this, the
equilibrium strategies and outcomes in Stage 1 will depend on the value of
the plaintiff’s outside option. Call the pair of payoffs from the exercise of this
option Wp = (W −F,−W ). The payoffs from the exercise of plaintiff’s outside
option are determined by the post-filing subgame and the plaintiff’s cost F of
exercising the option.
The highest defendant will ever offer in turn 1 is Spre−suit1 = δp(W−F )−b1p,
which plaintiff will accept. Given this, the highest settlement demand that
plaintiff can make in turn 0 is Spre−suit0 = δpδd(W − F ) − δdb1p + b0d. But if
plaintiff forgoes negotiation and invokes the outside option of suit right away,
she receives W − F . Thus, the parties will fail to settle, and plaintiff will
immediately file suit, if the latter is a higher payoff for the plaintff:
W − F > δpδd(W − F )− δdb1p + b0d (24)
or rearranging:
(1− δpδd)(W − F ) + δdb1p − b0d > 0 (25)
For N1 → ∞, we can explicitly consider the optimal amount of time plaintiff
is willing to negotiate before filing suit. Taking limits and using continuous
time, if plaintiff invokes her outside option at time n > 0, this will lead to a
settlement at time 0 where plaintiff demands, and defendant pays
Spre−suit0 (n) = e
−ρn(W − F ) + 1
2
n∫
0
e−ρt(bd(t)− bp(t))dt (26)
Thus, plaintiff’s optimal period during which plaintiff is willing to bargain is
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given by the solution to the following problem:
max
n
Spre−suit0 (n) = e
−ρn(W − F ) + 1
2
n∫
0
e−ρt(bd(t)− bp(t))dt (27)
The first order condition is
∂S0
∂n
= e−ρn
[
1
2
(bd(n)− bp(n))− ρ(W − F )
]
= 0 (28)
The second order condition is
∂2S0
∂n2
∣∣∣∣
n=n∗
=
1
2
e−ρn(b′d(n)− b′p(n)) > 0 (29)
In the simplest case, bi(t) = bi for i ∈ {p, d}. If so, only corner solutions
are relevant. If ∂S0
∂n
is negative, plaintiff gains nothing from bargaining, and
thus sues immediately. If ∂S0
∂n
is positive, plaintiff is willing to bargain through
period T , and thus plaintiff will reach a settlement at time 0 of S0(T ). Thus,
the condition for pre-suit bargaining failure is
ρ >
(
1
2
)
bd − bp
W − F (30)
B Appendix: Extensions
Risk Aversion and Non-Monetary Costs. The model can accommodate risk
aversion and non-monetary litigation costs with no changes to the substance
of the model. The value of non-monetary litigation costs, such as reputational
harms or bad publicity during litigation or anxiety over appearing in court,
can be incorporated into Cp and Cd. Conversely, benefits from the process of
litigation itself, such as the utility a plaintiff receives from having her day in
court, can be incorporated as negative costs.
Risk aversion is simply a species of litigation cost, given that litigation is
risky and settlement eliminates the risk. Formally, the difference between the
expected judgment and the certainty equivalent of a future judgment for each
party can be incorporated into each party’s litigation costs and thus is part of
the surplus from settlement. To the extent that the parties differ in their risk
aversion, this is equivalent to a difference in their litigation costs.
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Figures
Figure 1: Summary of Inside and Outside Options 
Feature Pre-Suit Post-Filing 
Per-turn costs 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 
Inside Option (0,0) (𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋, –𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋) 
P Outside Option (𝑊𝑊 − 𝐹𝐹, –𝑊𝑊)  
D Outside Option  ( 𝜋𝜋, – 𝜋𝜋) 
   
Notes:  𝑃𝑃 outside option involves transfer of 𝑊𝑊 and real cost 
of 𝐹𝐹; 𝑊𝑊 is determined endogenously. 
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Figure 4: Litigation and Default in Debt Collection Cases
 
TABLE __. TRIAL RATES IN FIRST INSTANCES COURTS, 2010–2015 
 
Total 
Terminations 
Default Judgments as 
% of Terminations 
Full Trials as % 
of Terminations 
Taiwan, Ordinary Procedure    
All Cases 215,022 16.4 41.4 
Debt Collection Cases 46,125 40.5 17.4 
Non Debt Collection Cases 168,897 9.8 48.0 
US Federal Courts    
All Cases 588,110 4.1 0.8 
Debt Collection Cases 13,659 48.3 0.3 
Non Debt Collection Cases 574,451 3.0 0.8 
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